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COMMENT
LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS AS FILM FINANCING
VEHICLES
I.

INTRODUCTION

The summer of 1994 was good for Hollywood, setting a new record
for box office receipts. Heralded as a record-breaking movie season, the
summer of 1994 grossed $2.2 billion in revenues, up slightly from the
previous summer's $2.1 billion In fact, "Tinseltown" has emerged as one
of the bright spots in this recession-battered United States economy,
growing 10% from 1992 and adding $4 billion to the total figure for United
States exports.2 High gross revenues, however, have not resulted in high
profits. As The Economist put it, "talk of profitability leaves Hollywood
nervous and defensive. ' 3 Lackluster profitability is partly attributable to
the "relentless growth" of production and marketing costs. 4 For example,
in 1992 the average cost of making a movie rose by 10% to $28.9
million.' Add to that the cost of marketing, which averaged $13.5 million
per film in 1992,6 and making a movie becomes a very expensive
proposition.
The "tidal wave of runaway costs" in making a movie has been
attributed partly to the advent of pay television and other markets for
films.' With these newer markets, even unsuccessful films can be salvaged
by a video or cable afterlife.' The potential profitability of these markets

1. Thomas R. King, Box-Office Sales For Summer Films Topped Expectations, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 6, 1994, at B6.
2. The Film Business: Unforgiven or Unrepentant?, ECONOMIST, Apr. 3, 1993, at 69.
3. Id.

4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.; see also infra p. 81.
7. Suzanna Andrews, Deal Game, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Nov. 1991, at 65 (quoting

Jeffrey Katzenberg).
8. Stratford P. Sherman, Coming Soon: Hollywood's Epic Shakeout, FORTUNE, Apr. 30,

1984, at 204.
9. Id. at 205.
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pushed the industry to spend more, based on the belief that costs would
ultimately be recouped.1 0 However, while some markets, such as cable
and pay-per-view, have provided a nice cushion for failures, the average
cost of many films has been impossible to recoup." For instance, in
1992, the average box office revenue for a movie was $10.1 million, only
one-third of the average cost of making and distributing a movie. 2
Despite high risk1 3 and disappointing returns on many films, limited
partnerships have proven to be useful financing vehicles for films. The use
of limited partnerships has long been a popular way to raise money for
independent film makers who often struggle to obtain financing for their
projects. 4 Due to the higher risk caused by rising costs of production and
marketing, even the major studios have increasingly relied on limited
partnerships to finance films. 1 5 Through public offerings, and increasingly
through private placements, 6 limited partnerships such as Delphi Film
Associates, Silver Screen Partners and Touchwood have successfully
financed many films. However, for every successful limited partnership
there have been unsuccessful ones. Consequently, there has been a rise in
the number of suits filed by disappointed investors against general partners,
brokers, and other professionals associated with unsuccessful limited
partnerships. 7 Recently, the decision in Central Bank of Denver v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver 8 limited the remedies available to investors by
restricting aiding and abetting liability under Rule lOb-5.19
This Comment presents a historical perspective of limited partnerships
and argues that since the Supreme Court decision of Central Bank of
Denver, the use of limited partnerships to finance films has become
increasingly risky to investors. Part II of this Comment discusses the

10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See infra pp. 82-83.
13. See SALOMON BROTHERS, UNITED STATES EQUITY RESEARCH, THE FILMED
ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY: IT'S A SMALL WORLD... AFrER ALL 11 (1993) ("[P]redicting hits
is tantamount to rolling the dice.").
14. Kirk Honeycutt, Limited PartnershipsRevived, HOLLYWOOD REP., June 5, 1992, at 37.
15. See Robert Marich, Largo's Cohen: Equity Key to Indie Funding, HOLLYWOOD REP.,
Dec. 9, 1992, at 19; Warner Movie Unit to Sell PartnershipsTotaling $125 Million, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 14, 1984, at 49.
16. See Hard Timefor Film Business, 8 ENT. LAW & FIN., no. 8, at 1 (1993) ("A bright spot
in all this is the growing success of entertainment companies in raising money through private
placements, rather than public offerings.").
17. See generally Donna K.H. Walters, New Liability Twist Has Lawyers, Accountants
Scurrying, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1992, at Dl.
18. 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988).
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formation of limited partnerships, the impact of the Tax Reform Act of
1986 on the future of limited partnerships and their use to finance film
projects. Part III of this Comment reviews the evolution of securities law
applicable to limited partnerships. First, the discussion establishes the
limited partnership's interest as a security. Next, this Comment distinguishes between the registration requirements of public offerings and
private placements. Then, this Comment reviews the issue of fraud in the
purchase or sale of securities under Rule lOb-5 by first examining primary
liability followed by a consideration of the risk of professional liability
under the secondary theory of aiding and abetting prior to CentralBank of
Denver. Finally, this Comment analyzes Central Bank of Denver and
concludes that the Court's limitation on aiding and abetting liability greatly
increases the risk of investing in limited partnerships used to finance films.
However, the Court left open the question whether Congress would enact
legislation to revive the private cause of action for aiding and abetting
liability, thus limited partnership financing may not be the risky proposition
it now seems.
I1. BACKGROUND
A.

Formationof Limited Partnerships

The limited partnership as a major investment vehicle was first used
in the nineteenth century as a means to achieve limited liability without
forming a corporation.20 It was later used primarily by wealthy investors
and entrepreneurs as a tax shelter vehicle. 2' Limited partnerships have
been used to finance such ventures as "orange groves, satellite transponders, timber stands and movie productions."'
One of the principal advantages of a limited partnership is that it
reduces the limited partners' general liability to the amount of their capital
contribution.'
Additionally, a limited partnership, although subject to
certain reporting requirements,2 4 is treated as an aggregation of its

20. Larry E. Ribstein, An Applied Theory of Limited Partnership,37 EMORY L.J. 835, 837

(1988).
21. Id.
22. Joanne Lipman, Real Estate SyndicatorsDream Up Exotic Deals to Win Back Investors,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 1985, at 23.
23. UNiF.LTD. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 7, 6 U.L.A. 559 (1969) [hereinafter ULPA].
24. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6031(a), 6050K, 6221-23 (West 1990).
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partners, thus it is not a taxable entity.25 Rather, partnership income is
taxed at the partner's level in proportion to each partner's capital contribution,26 which enables the partners to avoid double taxation of partnership
income. More importantly, the limited partners may share the tax results
of the limited partnership's operation as though the limited partnership did
not exist.
One of the main disadvantages of investing in a limited partnership
is that the limited partnership must file a certificate disclosing the identity
of the limited partners and the amount of their liability.27 This certificate
must then be made available for continuous public inspection.28 In
addition to the certificate requirement, the limited partners are required to
refrain from any participation in the management or control of the
business. 29 Despite the minimization of liability for limited partners, these
restrictions and other factors explain why the limited partnership remains
a specialized business structure employed by more sophisticated investors.
B.

The Future of Limited PartnershipsAfter the
Tax Reform Act of 1986

Limited partnerships enjoyed favorable tax treatment prior to the
passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.30 This favorable tax treatment
was, in fact, the main driving force behind the formation of many highly
leveraged, unsound limited partnerships. Publicly held companies also
began using the limited partnership form for financing purposes. Fearing
a large-scale loss of corporate tax revenue through the widespread use of
limited partnerships created to avoid taxes, Congress passed the Tax
Reform Act of 1986.31 The Tax Reform Act of 1986 removed the tax
shelter benefit by removing the ability to use excess losses or credits to
reduce income from other sources.32

25. I.R.C. § 701 (West 1990) ("A partnership as such shall not be subject to the income tax
imposed by this chapter. Persons carrying on business as partners shall be liable for income tax
only in their separate or individual capacities.").

26. I.R.C. § 702 (West 1990).
27. ULPA § 2(l)(a), supra note 23.

28. ULPA § 2(1)(b), supra note 23.
29. ULPA § 4, supra note 23 ("The contributions of a limited partner may be cash or other
property, but not services.").

30. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
31. Ribstein, supra note 20, at 838.
32. WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOSEPH BANKMAN, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION 711 (10th ed.
1994).
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Under the provision, losses generated by "passive activities"33 cannot
be applied against any income from other income-producing activities.'
This means that losses from limited partnerships could no longer be applied
to shelter income from other passive incomhe producing activities."
Despite the elimination of this tax shelter, limited partnerships are still
viable business structures. However, the focus has been on profitability
rather than on the sheltering of income."
C.

Use of Limited PartnershipsTo Finance Film Projects

The use of limited partnerships to finance films is not a new concept.
For example, between 1985 and 1990, Disney raised nearly $1.5 billion
through a series of limited partnerships.37 The use of limited partnerships
enabled Disney to transform itself into a major studio by allowing Disney
to produce twelve to fifteen films a year without risking much of its own
studio that has not needed to
capital.38 In fact, Disney is the only major
39
use its own cash or borrow from a bank.
Limited partnerships can finance either single projects or "blind
pools."'' With a portfolio of films, it is more likely that at least some of
the films will be successful and will help compensate for the unsuccessful
films. The benefit to investors of these large portfolio partnerships is
diversification and risk reduction. For instance, Touchwood Pacific
Partners I financed such box office hits as "Father of the Bride" and "The
Hand That Rocks the Cradle. ' 41 The same partnership also financed such
less-than-memorable films as "Ernest Scared Stupid," "Newsies" and
"Noises Off."'42 These portfolio partnerships are typically designed to be

33. Passive activities are defined as income-producing activities in which the taxpayer does

not materially participate. I.R.C. § 469(d)(1) (West 1990).
34. I.R.C. § 469(a) (West 1990).
35. I.R.C. § 469(d) (West 1990).
36. See Alexandra Peers, Investors Still Optfor Income-Oriented Rather Than Tax-Shelter
Partnerships, WALL ST. J., July 24, 1986, at 38.
37. Kathryn Harris, A Dilemmafor Disney; Films in Its Latest FinancingDeal Have Mostly
Been Clunkers, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 1992, at DI.
38. Laura Landro, Three Movie Studios Plan Two Offerings Of Partnershipsfor Up to $180
Feb. 6, 1985, at 7.
Million, WALL ST. J.,
39. Fun and Profit, ECONOMIST, Oct. 29, 1988, at 23.
40. Blind pools are composed of a portfolio of films that are not specified to the investors.
Thomas A. Cohen, Simplified Syndication for Stage and Screen: A Proposalfor Modifying
Securities Laws for the Financingof Theater andFilm Production, 13 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 533, 536 (1991).
41. Harris, supra note 37, at D1.
42. Id.
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eight-to ten-year investments, with minimized downside risk and an upside
profit potential.43
Despite the benefit of diversification and risk reduction that large
portfolio limited partnerships provide, there is criticism that these
partnerships are not sound investments. 44 According to the terms of the
Silver Screen IV prospectus, approximately 50% of the box office receipts
are retained by the theater owner, at least half of the remainder is paid to
the distributor, and the production costs and the general partners' fees get
paid before the investors can receive any return on their investment. 5
Notwithstanding media criticism," the Silver Screen Partnerships
yielded a respectable rate of return on investment of approximately 18%. 4'
However, the Silver Screen Partnerships appear to be an exception. De
Laurentis Film Partners, a publicly traded movie partnership, filed for
reorganization under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in
1987, and its shares were trading at eighteen cents in July of 1989, down
from $16.25 a share when the partnership first went public in 1987.48
According to one analyst, movie partnerships that do produce returns
usually yield rates similar to those on Treasury bills.49
Despite the potential for losses, many limited partnerships formed to
finance films have been very successful in raising capital. Silver Screen
IV, for instance, successfully met its goal of $400 million through a public
offering."0 This occurred despite negative publicity regarding the poor

43. "The downside risk is the loss of all or most of the invested capital." Cohen, supra note
40, at 536 n.19. "Upside profit potential affords the investor an opportunity to share in any and
all profits without any significant limitations." Id. at n.20.
44. See, e.g., Lisa Gubernick, Mickey Mouse's Sharp Pencil, FORBES, Jan. 7, 1991, at 40
("While the upfront fees to Silver Screen's promoters have been handsome, the returns to the
limited partners have been modest."); Laura Jereski, So You Want To Be In Pictures, FORBES,
Mar. 21, 1988, at 36 ("The Silver Screen versions show a whole new dimension in using other
people's money."). The scathing March 1988 article in Forbes magazine led Silver Screen
Management Services to sue Forbes for libel. The trial court in New York dismissed the case,
finding that the article consisted of opinions based on facts which were "free of material error."
Court Dismisses Libel Action Against ForbesMagazine Arising From Article On Financing of
Walt Disney Films By Silver Screen Limited Partnerships,ENT. L. REP., Mar. 1992.
45. Jereski, supra note 44, at 37.
46. See supra note 44.
47. Richard Turner, Movies: Disney to Get $600 Million FromJapan to Make Movies, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 23, 1990, at B1. But see Earl C. Gottschalk, Jr., Your Money Matters: Film
PartnershipsAre Often Star-Crossed,FORBES, July 12, 1989, at C1 ("investors would have made
more money by just investing in Disney common stock" which rose four-fold between 1985 and
1989).
48. Gottschalk, supra note 47.
49. Id.
50. Jereski, supra note 44, at 36.
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performance of Silver Screen 11, and that Silver Screen IV's structure
provided for a lower return than Silver Screen II. Some attribute the
successful sale of Silver Screen IV and other limited partnerships to the
glamour of owning a piece of a movie, "which appeals to the vanity of
unsophisticated investors. 5 1 Whatever the reason, limited partnerships,
as a vehicle for financing films, play a vital role in the movie industry.

III. SEcuRrrIFs LAW ISSUES APPLICABLE TO LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS
A.

A Limited PartnershipInterest as a "Security"

If a limited partnership interest is considered a "security" under the
federal securities laws, several issues must be addressed.52 Among the
most important are (1) the registration requirements under federal and/or
state securities laws, (2) the consequences of not complying with such
registration requirements, which include a private remedy of rescission or
an enforcement action by the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") and/or one or more states, and (3) the anti-fraud provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"), which are
applicable regardless of whether a security is exempt from registration.
Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act") and
Section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act define a "security" as a "certificate
of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement" or an "investment contract."5 3 "[Plarticipation in a profit-sharing agreement" is not
broader in its meaning than an "investment contract." 54
The Supreme Court in SEC v. Howey 5 enunciated a test for
determining whether an instrument is an "investment contract" or a
security. An instrument is a "security" if it constitutes [1] an investment

51. Fun and Profit, ECONOMIST, Oct. 29, 1988, at 23; see also Gottschalk, supra note 47
("[Miajor value [of movie limited partnerships] is 'limited to the cocktail circuit.., so you can
tell a friend you have a piece of a hit picture' (quoting Steven Bleier)); Randall Smith, All That
Glittersin Movie Deals Doesn't Lead To a Pot of Goldfor Investors in Partnerships,WALL ST.

J., Mar. 4, 1987, at 63 ("[M]oney isn't everything. ... '[An interest in movie partnerships]
provides people with more psychic income and boasting privileges than a stock ... ' (quoting
Harold Vogel)).
52. John W. Cones, Feature Film Limited Partnerships:A Practical Guide Focusing On
Securities and Marketing For Independent Producersand Their Attorneys, 12 LOY. L.A. ENT.

L.J. 19, 24 (1992).
53. Securities Act § 2(1); Exchange Act § 3(a)(10).
54. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniels, 439 U.S. 551, 558 n.1 1 (1979).
55. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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of money [2] "in a common enterprise," [3] with the expectation of profits,
''s6
[4] derived "solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.
The first two prongs of the test, along with the fourth prong, are
usually easily satisfied, while the third prong has proved to be more
problematic. Since a purchase of a limited partnership interest constitutes
an investment of money, the first prong of the test is readily satisfied. In
addition, limited partnerships, by definition, satisfy the common enterprise
requirement because the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act57
requires two or more persons to form a limited partnership with at least one
as the general and one or more as limited partners. Finally, a limited
partnership's interest usually satisfies the fourth prong of the test because
limited partners are not permitted to take an active part in the management
of the limited partnership's business.5 8 Thus, they rely on the "efforts of
others."
The third prong requires that the investment be made "with expectation of profits" 59 through "either capital appreciation resulting from the
development of the initial investment ... or a participation in earnings

resulting from the use of investor's funds,"' even where the venture is
primarily undertaken for its tax shelter benefits. 6' However, most courts
do require that "profits" include some economic return, holding that tax
benefits alone will not constitute "profit" as intended by the Howey test.
Even a mere attempt to earn economic profit, though largely tax motivated,
satisfies the "profit" requirement for a number of courts. 62 However,
some courts hold that tax benefits alone can constitute "profit" for purposes
of the Howey test.63 If the structure of Silver Screen Partners IV is

56. Id. at 301.
57. The Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act has been adopted by most jurisdictions.

58. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299.
59. Id.
60. United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975).
61. See, e.g., El Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 900 (1974) (tax benefits and investment leverage); Schultz v. Rector-Phillips-Morse, 552
S.W.2d 4 (Ark. 1977) (FHA-subsidized apartment complex).

62. See, e.g., Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,440 U.S. 939
(1979); McConnell v. Frank Howard Allen & Co., 574 F. Supp. 781 (N.D. Cal. 1983); SEC v.

International Mining Exch., 515 F. Supp. 1062 (D. Colo. 1981).
63. See, e.g., Kolibash v. Sagittarius Recording Co., 626 F. Supp. 1173, 1179 (S.D. Ohio

1986) (holding that, where "tax benefits are the primary or dominant economic inducement for
investing, such tax benefits may properly be considered 'profits."'); Investors Credit Corp. v.
94,343, at
Extended Warranties, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)

92,257-59 (M.D. Tenn. 1989) (holding that the purchase of an aircraft with an expectation of tax
benefits which would accrue from ownership of the aircraft constituted the purchase of a security).
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typical, then limited partnerships formed to finance films are likely to be
deemed "securities."
B.

The Registration Requirement
1. Public Offerings

Interests in limited partnerships that are determined to be securities
can be sold either through a public offering or a private placement. If a
public offering is chosen, the securities must be registered pursuant to the
Securities Act' and the rules of each state where the securities may be
offered or sold. 65 The costs of complying with the registration requirements can be very high. For instance, the underwriters' fees account for
approximately 10% of the public offering price.'e Moreover, there are
additional costs for filing fees and legal, accounting, and printing
expenses. ' Reporting requirements of the Exchange Act6s also add to
these costs. These reporting requirements include the filing of annual
reports and other reports containing specifically prepared financial
statements and detailed information about a wide range of subjects.69
Perhaps due to the high costs associated with public offerings, the current
trend in raising capital for films is toward the use of private placement.70
2.

Private Placements: Section 4(2)

Securities sold through a private placement are exempt from the
registration requirements discussed above. Section 4(2) of the Securities
Act provides that the registration requirements do not apply to "transactions

64. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74,78 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77a

(1988)).
65. In 1985, Silver Screen Partners II was required to return $4.7 million to 700 to 900
Massachusetts investors for failing to register its offering with the state. Silver Screen Agrees To
Return $4.7 Million In PartnershipFunds, WALL ST. J., June 5, 1985, at 20.
66. LARRY D. SODERQUIST, UNDERSTANDING THE SEcuRrIES LAWS 29 (3d ed. 1993).

67. Id.at 30 (filing fees are paid to the SEC, the National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc., and the states in which the securities are sold).
68. Exchange Act § 15(d). These reporting requirements include the filing of "[a]nnual and
other reports, containing specially prepared financial statements and detailed information about
a wide range of subjects." SODERQUIST, supra note 66, at 31.
69. SODERQUIST, supra note 66, at 31.
70. See Hard Time for Film Business, supra note 16, at 1.
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not involving any public offering.' ' This statutory exemption is the most
important available to issuers of limited partnership securities.7'
SEC v. Ralston Purina Co. 73 is the leading case enumerating the
requirements for a private placement. The Supreme Court set forth
guidelines for differentiating between a public offering and a private
placement. The Court found that the applicability of the exemption
provided by Section 4(2) "should turn on whether the particular class of
persons affected needs the protection of the act."74 The class of persons
are "those who are shown to be able to fend for themselves."75 The Court
then discussed the satisfaction of that requirement in terms of access on the
part of the offeree to the "kind of information which registration would
disclose."76
"Building on these concepts, [lower] courts have developed flexible
tests for the private offering exemption."'77 For instance, the Fifth Circuit
found the following factors to be relevant: (1) the number of offerees and
their relationship to each other and to the issuer, (2) the number of units
offered, (3) the size of the offering and (4) the manner of the offering.78
In comparison, the First Circuit has offered a slightly different list of
criteria: "Sales may. . . be exempted... if a private offering is made in
which the purchasers (1) are limited in number, (2) sophisticated, and (3)
have a relationship with the issuer enabling them to command access to
information that would otherwise be contained in a registration statement.

79

The Ninth Circuit focuses on: "(1) the number of offerees, (2) the
sophistication of the offerees, (3) the size and manner of the offering and
(4) the relationship of the offerees to the issuer."80 Of these factors, the
requirements of offeree sophistication and availability of information are
now generally recognized." Therefore, the current trend of using private
placements rather than public offerings in raising funds for films is
expected to continue.

71. Securities Act § 4(2).
72. SODERQUIST, supra note 66, at 134.

73. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
74. Id. at 125.

75. Id.
76. Id. at 127.
77. SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 644 (9th Cir. 1980).

78. Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 900 (5th Cir. 1977); Hill York
Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc. 448 F.2d 680, 687-89 (5th Cir. 1971).

79. Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 691 (1st Cir. 1978).
80. SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d at 644-45 (citations omitted).
81. THOMAS LEE HAzEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 4.21 (student ed. 1990).
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C. Fraud in the Purchase or Sale of Securities
In the wake of the recession and the collapse of various markets,
unhappy investors facing considerably depreciated limited partnership
interests have turned to the courts to recoup their losses.82 In addition to
the partnerships' officers or employees, accountants, 83 attorneys,.'
brokers, 5 and other professionals 8 6 have borne the brunt of the investors'
frustration. By 1990, the Justice Department received more than 21,000
referrals from government agencies looking to recover damages for savings
and loan failures. 87

1. Rule lOb-5: Primary Liability
Disappointed investors have filed civil actions against general partners,
brokers, and other professionals for violations of Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act 8 and SEC Rule lOb-5. These suits have alleged misrepre-

82. Walters, supra note 17, at Dl; see also William Power & Jill Bettner, Troubles Mount
for $5 Billion of Public Partnerships,WALL ST. J., June 8, 1989, at Cl.
83. See, e.g., Fine v. American Solar King Corp., 919 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 576 (1991) (accounting firm allegedly aided and abetted securities violation by issuing
a materially false and misleading qualified audit report); Rudolph v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 800
F.2d 1040 (1 th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,480 U.S. 946 (1987) (an accounting firm allegedly aided
and abetted the diversion of funds by an organizer of a sports car venture).
84. See, e.g., Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492
U.S. 918 (1989) (counsel not liable as an aider and abettor for its involvement in the preparation
of a bond offering); Moore v. Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297, 306 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S.
1006 (1987) (law firm not liable as an aider and abettor for its preparation of offering circulars).
85. See Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1039 (1978) (registered representative allegedly aided and abetted investment advisor's fraud by
recklessly assuring the investor of his confidence in the investment advisor who was mishandling
the investor's portfolio).
86. See, e.g., Woods v. Barnett Bank, 765 F.2d 1004 (11th Cir. 1985) (bank); Edwards &
Hanly v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1979) (brokerage firm).
87. Edward Brodsky, Accountants' Liability in the Savings & Loan Crisis,204 N.Y. LJ.22
(1990).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988).
The section provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange (a) To effect a short sale, or to use or employ any stop-loss order in
connection with the purchase or sale, of any security registered on a national
securities exchange, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
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sentation or failure to disclose risks associated with the investments by the
general partners and brokers. Moreover, through April 1994, the lawsuits
allege aiding and abetting by other professionals who were involved with
in offerings.
Although security law provides several antifraud remedies, 9 the most
important remedy seems to be found in Rule lOb-5. Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or
the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) [t]o employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b)
[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or (c) [t]o engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 90

Rule lOb-5 was enacted to include the purchase of securities to the general
anti-fraud provisions. 91 The previous provision only covered fraudulent
sales of securities.9 2
Originally, neither Section 10(b) 93 itself nor the general anti-fraud
provisions of Rule lOb-5 94 expressly authorized a private cause of action
for violation of Section 10(b)'s provisions. 95 Nevertheless, the courts did
not delay in finding an implied private right of action under the rule.

manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and

regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
89. Sections 11, 15, and 17(a) of the 1933 Act are also anti-fraud provisions which supply
express and implied private remedies.

90. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992).
91. Securities Act § 17(a).
92. Rule lob-5 was drafted rather hastily by combining the numbered subdivisions of

Securities Act Section 17(a), which describe various kinds of prohibited conduct, with portions
of the Exchange Act Section 10(b), which contained the language "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance." The
same day the rule was drafted, the Commissioners passed it without any comment, except for
Sumner Pike, who said, "Well, we are against fraud, aren't we?" SODERQUIsT, supra note 66,
at 237 (quoting from Proceedings,Conference on Codification of the FederalSecurities Laws,
22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967)).

93. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988).
94. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992).
95. Cheryl L. Pollack, Rule 10b-5 Liability after Hochfelder: Abandoning the Concept of
Aiding and Abetting, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 218, 218 (1977).
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In 1946, a district court in Pennsylvania found that an implied private
action exists under the rule.96 However, the Supreme Court halted the
expansion of the rule in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores' and
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.98 The scope of private right of action has
since been further limited. 99 Thus, investors in limited partnerships,
including those who finance films, face an increased chance of risk from
their limited avenues of recovery.
a.

The "In Connection With" Requirement

In order for Rule 1Ob-5 to apply, the conduct prohibited must be made
"in connection with the purchase or sale of a security."'" But as the
Third Circuit noted, "[a]lmost without exception, [federal courts] have
found compliance with the 'connection' requirement even where fraudulent
conduct is implicated only tangentially in a securities transaction." '
b. Standing: "Purchaser-Seller" Requirement
Under the Birnbaum rule,1" 2 a private plaintiff must be a purchaser
or seller of securities in order to have standing to sue under Rule lOb-5.
Notwithstanding the rule, the lower courts have allowed some exceptions.103
In its first "purchaser-seller" requirement case,'0 4 the Supreme Court
recapitulated Birnbaum's limited scope, reasoning that the absence of the
requirement would lead to various evils."0 This made it clear that the
Court's view of Rule lOb-5 was no longer broad and expansive. As a
result, investors in limited partnerships were further restricted in their
recoupment of investment losses.

96. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
97. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
98. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
99. See HAZEN, supra note 81, § 13.2.
100. Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022, 1025 (3d Cir. 1977).
101. Id. at 1026.
102. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
103. One exception recognized by courts is the forced-seller exception. Here, a shareholder
is put in the position of a forced seller. SODERQUIST, supra note 66, at 246.
104. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
105. Id. at 725.
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c. Proving the Element of Reliance Under lOb-5
A great deal of litigation involving limited partnerships considers the
issue of investor reliance on material misstatements or omissions under
Rule lOb-5Y°6 In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States of Utah,'0 7 the
Supreme Court found that:
[u]nder the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a
failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite
to recovery. All that is necessary is that facts withheld be
material .... This obligation to disclose and this withholding
of a material fact establish the requisite element of causation in
fact. 0 8
Once materiality of the omission is established, the defendant is allowed to
rebut the presumption by proving that the plaintiff did not rely on the
omissions."
Reliance is presumed even in the absence of any proof that a plaintiff
relied individually on a defendant's misstatement or omission under the
"fraud on the market" theory. As articulated in Blackie v. Barrack,° the
theory postulates:
A purchaser on the stock exchanges... relies generally on the
supposition that the market price is validly set and that no
unsuspected manipulation has artificially inflated the price, and
thus indirectly on the truth of the representations underlying the
stock price - whether he is aware of it or not, the price he pays
reflects material representations.'
Under the "fraud on the market" theory, even if the plaintiff cannot
show that she relied on a defendant's misstatement, reliance on the
misstatement is presumed. Yet in film financing, investors are often aware
at the outset of the high risk of potential loss associated with limited
partnerships. This theory was later accepted by the Supreme Court in Basic
1 12

Inc. v. Levinson.

106. See Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121 (7th Cir. 1993); Block v. First Blood
Assocs., 691 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
107. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
108. Id. at 153-54.

109. See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
110. 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975).
111. Id. at 907.
112. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
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In addition to reliance, the plaintiff must also allege and prove that
she would not have lost money if the facts had been as stated in the
offering materials.1 ' For example, in Bastian v. Petren Resources
Corp. 4 the court held that the failure to allege loss causation was fatal.
Thus, the complaint had to be dismissed." 5 In that case, the plaintiffs
sued under Rule 10b-5 alleging that they would not have purchased their
interests in oil and gas limited partnerships but for alleged material
misstatements and omissions in the defendants' offering materials relating
to the defendants' integrity and competence.Y6 Yet the court held that
investors failed to satisfy the causation requirement since they neglected to
include a "reason why the investment was wiped out."'" 7 Consequently,
an investor in limited partnerships has the increased burden of proving loss
in order to recover.
d.

Fault Required

One of the refinements that generally made Rule 10b-5 less useful to
private plaintiffs is the requirement of fault. With this additional
requirement, investment in limited partnerships has remained a high risk.
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,"8 the Court found that scienter, rather
than mere negligence, was required to support a verdict for a private Rule
lOb-5 plaintiff. In its discussion, the Supreme Court specifically left open
the question of whether recklessness by itself would be sufficient to
constitute scienter. However, some courts that have addressed the issue
have found that recklessness constitutes scienter119
2.

Rule lOb-5: Professional Liability Under the Secondary
Theory of Aiding and Abetting

In addition to primary liability under Rule 10b-5, professionals were
sued under Rule 10b-5's secondary theory of aiding and abetting. The
explosion of such suits had been so phenomenal and payouts so daunt-

113. See HAZEN, supra note 81, § 13.6.
114. 892 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1990).
115. Id. at 685.
116. Ld.
117. Id. at 684 (noting that losses can occur from a decline in the economy).
118. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
119. See, e.g., Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1023-24 (6th Cir.
1979); McDonald v. Alan Bush Brokerage Co., 863 F.2d 809, 814 (11th Cir. 1989).
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ing"20 that accountants worried that "[t]he possibility that no firms
[would] be willing to take on clients in risky industries."' 2 1 The Court
addressed the professionals' concerns and held in Central Bank of Denver
that aiding and abetting did not exist under Rule lOb-5; thus reducing the
vulnerability of professionals to liability.
a. The Aiding and Abetting Standard Prior to Central Bank of Denver
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,'" the Supreme Court had expressly
reserved the issue of whether there was an implied right in a private action
under Rule lOb-5 to assert claims against one who aids and abets the
primary violator. In that case, the lower court had held an accounting firm
liable as an aider and abettor for negligently failing to conduct a proper
audit of a brokerage firm whose president defrauded its shareholders." z
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court, holding that scienter was
required for a lOb-5 violation. The Court, however, did not reach the
question of aiding and abetting:
In view of our holding that an intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud is required for civil liability under Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5, we need not consider whether civil liability for
aiding and abetting is appropriate under the section and the rule,
nor the elements necessary to establish such cause of action. 24
On the other hand, the circuit courts actively dealt with liability for
aiding and abetting. 2 5 In formulating the doctrine of aiding and abetting,

120. See, e.g., Michael Arndt, FourHundredMillion DollarS&L Case Penalty: Accounting
Firm Accused of Lax Audits, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 24, 1992, 1, at 16 (Resolution Trust Corporation

filed suit seeking $400 million from Arthur Andersen & Co. for its role in the failure of Benjamin
Franklin Savings and Loan); Kenneth H. Bacon & Lee Berton, Ernst to Pay $400 Million Over
Audit of 4 Big Thrifts, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 1992, at A3 (accounting firm Coopers & Lybrand

agreed to pay at least $140 million to settle claims related to its audit of Mini Scribe Corp.).
121. Walters, supra note 17, at Dl.
122. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
123. Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 425 U.S. 185

(1976).
124. Hochfelder,425 U.S. at 191-92 n.7. See also Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459
U.S. 375, 379 n.5 (1983) (noting that the Supreme Court specifically reserved the issue of
aider-and-abettor liability in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder).

125. See, e.g., Ligon v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 957 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1992) (no liability);
Fine v. American Solar King Corp., 919 P.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 576
(1991) (triable issue of fact on the aiding and abetting claim); Robin v. Arthur Young & Co., 915
F.2d 1120 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1317 (1991) (no liability); Roberts v. Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 857 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1002 (1989)

(investors stated claim against accounting firm for aiding and abetting); Windon Third Oil & Gas
Drilling Partnership v. FDIC, 805 F.2d 342 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987)
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the courts adopted a varying formulation of Section 876 of the Restatement
of Torts. 12 6 The elements of aiding and abetting included: "(1) violation
of the securities laws by a primary party; (2) knowledge of that violation
by the secondary party; and (3) 'substantial assistance' rendered to the
primary party by the secondary party."127 Therefore, limited partnership
investors had the potential to recover from "deep-pocket" sources, in lieu
of the primary source who most likely had lost money in the investment as
well.
b.

Central Bank of Denver v. Interstate Bank of Denver

In 1994, the Supreme Court finally addressed the scope of Section
10(b) aiding and abetting in order to resolve the continuing confusion. In
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,12 the Court
held that Section 10(b) prohibits investors from filing suits charging that
someone "aided or abetted" deceptive acts involving stock or bond
transactions. 29 Writing for the majority in a 5-4 ruling, Justice Kennedy
noted that statutory text controls the definition of conduct covered by the
Securities Exchange Act's general anti-fraud provision. 130 Further, the
majority also found that Section 10(b) prohibits the making of a material
misstatement or omission, or the commission of a manipulative act, but it
does not prohibit aiding securities fraud.'
The case before the Court arose after investors sued participants in a
1988 sale of municipal bonds. 3 2 The suit, brought after the issuing
authority defaulted on the bonds, named, among others, Central Bank of
Denver, which had served as trustee for the offering and had allegedly
helped defraud investors. The Tenth Circuit held that bondholders could
sue the Central Bank of Denver.133 In reversing, the Supreme Court
rejected an array of arguments by investor advocates and the SEC,

(no liability); Rudolph v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 800 F.2d 1040 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
480 U.S. 946 (1987) (complaint stated claim against accounting firm for aiding and abetting);
Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774 (1st Cir. 1983) (no liability); lIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d
909 (2d Cir. 1980) (no liability).
126. Timothy M. Metzger, Comment, Abandoning Accountants' Liability for Aiding and
Abetting 10b-5 Securities Fraud, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1374, 1382 (1993).
127. Id.
128. 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1448.
132. Il at 1443.
133. CentralBank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
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including the notion that an expansive reading of Section 10(b) is consistent
with the broad policy objectives of the securities laws.134
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens pointed out that, when
applying Section 10(b), courts assumed that a statute passed to protect a
particular group, such as investors, conferred on members of the group a
right to sue violators. 3 5 He opined that "[the Court] should ... be
reluctant to lop off rights of action that have been recognized for decades,
even if136the judicial methodology that gave them birth is now out of
favor."
Although the main beneficiaries of this ruling have been lawyers,
accountants and other financial advisers commonly swept into "vexatious"
investor lawsuits, alleging securities fraud, 137 the court left open the
possibility that aiding and abetting may again become viable. 38 Thus,
although the risk of loss in limited partnerships has increased due to the
holding in Central Bank of Denver, Congress could feasibly enact
legislation reviving aiding and abetting liability by investors against "deeppockets." Accordingly, if Congress enacted such a statute, the attractiveness
of limited partnerships as a film financing vehicle could increase in the
future.
3.

Damages and Penalties in lOb-5 Cases

As a result of the general failure of limited partnerships, investors
were forced to seek damages from "deep-pockets" to recoup their losses.
However, despite the large number of cases brought under Rule lOb-5,
damage issues are far from resolved.139 The Supreme Court has never
provided guidelines for setting damages, and lower courts have differed on
which damage formulation would be appropriate.

134. Id. at 1451.
135. Id. at 1456.
136. Id. at 1460.
137. See Monroe v. Hughes, 31 F.3d 772, 776 (9th Cir. 1994); Twiss v. Kury, 25 F.3d 1151,
1558 (11th Cir. 1994).
138. Central Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. at 1452. The Court held in pertinent part:
It does not follow... that Congress' failure to overturn a statutory precedent is a
reason for this Court to adhere to it. It is "impossible to assert with any degree of

assurance that congressional failure to act represents" affirmative congressional
approval of the [Court's] statutory interpretation.... Congress may legislate,
moreover, only by passage of a bill which is approved by both Houses and signed

by the President... Congressional inaction cannot amend a duly enacted statute.
Id. (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 n.1 (1989)).
139. SODERQUIST, supra note 66, at 259.
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Generally, there are three approaches for measuring damages.' 4410
The most commonly used approach is the "out-of-pocket" measure.
This approach determines damages by looking at the difference between the
price paid or received and the actual value of the securities at the time of
purchase or sale. 42 This measure is problematic because valuation must
often be resolved by expert testimony, which may substantially differ. 43
Next, the "causation-in-fact" approach allows for the "recovery of
damages caused by erosion of the market price of the security that is
traceable to the tippee's wrongful trading."'" Although this approach
attempts to limit damages to the actual harm suffered by a plaintiff, it
involves very difficult problems of proof.4
Finally, the "disgorgement" measure allows the recovery of "any
post-purchase decline in market value of the investor's shares up to a
reasonable time after he learns of the tipped information or after there is a
public disclosure of it."' 46 This recovery, however, is limited to. the
"amount gained by the tippee as a result of his selling at the earlier date
rather than delaying his sale until the parties could trade on an equal
informational basis."' 47 When the constraints of the disgorgement
measure are not applied, a defendant who has made only a negligible profit
through inside trading is subject to the possibility of limitless damages.' 48
IV. CONCLUSION

Against the backdrop of the highest grossing year for the movie
industry, limited partnerships as film financing vehicles have had mixed
results. Explosive growth in recent years of film production and marketing
costs have eaten into the bottom line of already risky film financing limited
partnerships.
Consequently, many have been criticized as unsound
investments.
Limited partnerships were first developed in the nineteenth century as
a means to limit individual liability and diffuse tax consequences.
However, with the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congress removed the tax

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980).
HA EN, supra note 81, § 13.7.
Id. § 13.7 n.31.
Id.
Elkind, 635 F.2d at 171.
See Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1976).
Elkind, 635 F.2d at 172.
Id.
SODERQUIST, supra note 66, at 260.
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benefit of limited partnerships. Limited partners may no longer use excess
losses or credits from one source as a means of reducing income from other
sources.
Under current law, limited partnerships investors have recourse against
the misrepresentation or omission of risks by general partners, brokers and
other professionals under a theory of primary liability. Prior to April 1994,
investors could recover by alleging secondary liability against professionals
such as attorneys and accountants involved in the transaction. However,
the Supreme Court in CentralBank of Denver held that current law cannot
be read to include secondary liability for aiding and abetting. Thus,
following Central Bank of Denver, film investors have restricted avenues
of recovery for losses incurred as a result of unprofitable limited partnerships. The possibility of recovering from secondary "deep-pocket" sources
has been entirely foreclosed, effectively increasing the overall risk
associated with investment in limited partnerships.
Notwithstanding the risks of investment, the glamour of the industry
continues to lure investors into film-financing limited partnerships.
Heaja M. Kim*

* The author would like to thank the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles
Entertainment Law Journal for their invaluable assistance, with special thanks to Michele
Goldsmith, Teri Hollander, Sandy Jacobson, and Susan Smith.
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PRINT AND ADVERTISING COSTS OF NEW FEATURES
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*SALOMON BROTHERS, UNITED STATES EQUITY RESEARCH, THE FILMED ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY: IT'S A SMALL WORLD ... AFrER ALL 26 (1993).
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AVERAGE PRODUCTION COSTS, GROSS REVENUE, AND PROFITS
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SALOMON BROTHERS, UNITED STATES EQUITY RESEARCH, THE FILMED ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY: IT'S A SMALL WORLD... AFTER ALL 24 (1993).
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MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA AVERAGE NEGATIVE COSTS
VERSUS Box OFFICE REVENUE, 1980-92 (DOLLARS IN THOUSANDS)*

Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992

Percent Change in
Production Costsfrom:
Prior 1992
Year

Number
of
Films
233
239
428
495
536
470
451
507
491
492
410
448
484

$9,382.5
$11,335.6
$11,849.5
$11,884.8
$14,412.6
$16,779.2
$17,454.6
$20,050.5
$18,061.3
$23,453.5
$26,783.2
$26,135.5
$28,858.3

5.3
20.8
4.5
0.3
21.3
16.4
4.0
14.9
(9.9)
29.9
14.2
(2.4)
10.4

Average
Production Cost
per Film

207.6
154.6
143.5
142.8
100.2
72.0
65.3
43.9
59.8
23.0
7.7
10.4
-

$11,796
$12,408
$8,067
$7,608
$7,519
$7,977
$8,376
$8,388
$9,080
$10,230
$12,248
$10,721
$10,064

Net Profit

(Loss)°
.

$2,413.5
$1,072.4
($3,782.5)
($4,276.8)
($6,893.6)
($8,802.2)
($9,078.6)
($11,662.5)
($8,981.3)
($13,223.5)
($14,535.2)
($15,414.5)
($18,794.3)

Box Office
Gross per
Film

*SALOMON BROTHERS, UNITED STATES EQurIy RESEARCH, THE FILMED ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY: IT'S A SMALL WORLD ...

AF ER ALL 24 (1993).
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